Despite progress in reducing stockpiles after the end of the Cold War, the disturbing actions of some nations could spread nuclear weapon capabilities and enlarge existing arsenals.
The NPT was built on a strategic bargain: The overwhelming majority of countries agreed to join the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, to not ac quire nuclear weapons, and to allow inspections of their nuclear facilities. In return, the five nuclear weapon states-the US, UK, and USSR (now Russia), later joined by China and France and collectively known as the P5-pledged to work toward the elim ination of their nuclear arsenals and to allow the sharing of peaceful nuclear technology with the non-nuclear-weapon states. 1 At the time, the NPT signatories understood that the total elimination of all nuclear weapons was likely to be far in the future. Nearly half a century later, that's still the case. But India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea are not parties to the NPT, and dealing with their capabilities and those of the P5 proceeds in parallel with efforts involving the non nuclear NPT parties. Figure 1 outlines the history of nuclear weapon proliferation since the first test in 1945. The US and USSR-Russia stockpiles have each declined by almost an order of magnitude from their peaks; the UK and French stockpiles have modestly declined. For others, either the picture is uncertain or the numbers are increasing.
If Iran were to build the bomb, in violation of its NPT obligations, how would NPT non-nuclear weapon states, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, react? If the US, China, or Russia were to resume nuclear testing, would that lead to testing by others and to new deployments of nuclear weapons? The NPT "regime" extends beyond the treaty in numer ous ways to help counter those and other risks. Tools such as diplomacy between nations, arms con- 
The NPT-CTBT intersection
International law is not domestic law. Enforcement of international nonproliferation agreements in cludes measures decided by the UN Security Coun cil. But those measures are effective only if most of the global community of nations adhere to them. Unfortunately, confidence in the NPT has been com plicated by the fact that the CTBT, opened for sig nature in 1996, has yet to enter into force-that is, be ratified into law by China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and the US. (See the article by Jeremiah Sullivan, PHYSICS TODAY, March 1998, page 24.)
The holdouts are troubling. For one thing, there is broad international support for the CTBT: The treaty has been signed by 183 states, has been ratified by 162, and bans nuclear tests at any yield, at any place, and for all time. For another, during negotia tions to secure a permanent extension of the NPT, France, Russia, the UK, and the US sent a letter, dated 19 April 1995 (China later agreed), to the NPT Review and Extension Conference promising a CTBT: 1 We reaffirm our determination to con tinue to negotiate intensively, as a high priority, a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehen sive nuclear test-ban treaty, and we pledge our support for its conclusion without delay. . . . We call upon all States parties to the [NPT] to make the treaty provisions permanent. This will be crucial for the full realization of the goals set out in Article VI.
In 1999, when the US Senate considered giving its advice and consent to ratification, it declined to do so. In the hearings and floor debate, the verifiability of the treaty and the effectiveness of the US nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosive testing were principal issues cited as problematic. The contention caused by the failure of the US and the other seven states to ratify the CTBT does not help develop the global consensus needed to en force nonproliferation undertakings. Without the CTBT, the NPT is perceived as a treaty of unbal anced obligations.
A ban on nuclear tests is a nonproliferation and arms-control measure that raises the barrier for states to move toward nuclear weapons and blocks existing nuclear powers from substantial new tech nical advances. Although such a barrier would not prevent the development of simple gun-type weapons, which typically do not require testing to work, it prevents development of thermonuclear weapons and the miniaturization of nuclear weapons for missiles. 3 At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all 189 NPT members viewed the CTBT's entry into force as essential for a strengthened nonproliferation regime. In December 2013 the United Nations Gen eral Assembly urged all nations to sign and ratify the CTBT on a vote of 181 yes, 1 no (North Korea), and 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria). The Obama administration has declared its support for Senate action to ratify the treaty.
Seismic monitoring
Since 1963, when the LTBT was adopted, the capa bilities of seismology to detect underground nuclear explosions have steadily improved. By the time the CTBT was negotiated at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in the mid 1990s, seismic instru mentation had matured so dramatically that it and other test-detection technologies provided a very effective means to verify states' compliance with the new treaty.
The CTBT establishes the International Monitor ing System (IMS), networks comprising 321 seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound sen sors around the world-84% of them certified, 5% in stalled, 6% in construction, and 5% planned. Thanks to the relatively high density of the 170-station seis mic network, states have access to a richer set of data than was possible when the LTBT was negotiated, when there was no regular access to territories of states of interest, particularly the USSR. The seismic network can detect explosions at more reduced yield levels than previously. "National technical means"-the nationally owned and operated seis mic and other sensors, reconnaissance satellites, ships, and aircraft-provide an additional and pow erful source of verification that exceeds the capabil ity of the IMS networks.
Regional and long-range seismic waves are used to distinguish between explosions and earth quakes, estimate the magnitude of an event, and determine its location so that follow-up onsite in spections can be carried out in ambiguous cases. Consider figure 2, which compares seismograms from a low-magnitude earthquake, a chemical ex plosion, and the 9 October 2006 nuclear explosion in North Korea. The nuclear test was detected widely by the IMS and other stations in South Korea, China, and Japan. A later North Korean nu clear explosion, on 12 February 2013, was detected by 96 IMS stations, which were able to locate the test site to within 8 km.
Regional waves predominantly travel through Earth's crust and upper mantle and are strongly af fected by local geology, which can complicate inter pretation, but they offer better, more detailed results than long-range waves. In 2001 seismologists Vitaly Khalturin, Tanya Rautian, and Paul Richards ana lyzed the regional signals collected between 1961 and 1989 at distances 500-1500 km from under ground explosions at the former Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. Usefully detailed seis mic information was found in the old Soviet data from all but two of 340 tests with yields over a ton. 4 Newer broadband seismographs are suffi ciently sensitive that, according to a 2002 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study, 5 underground nuclear explosions conducted in hard rock anywhere in Europe, Asia, North Africa, and North America can be reliably detected and identified as explosions down to a yield of 0.1 kt using IMS data. The denser the seismic network in a particular region, the greater the detection probability. A 2012 National Re search Council (NRC) report has mapped the mag nitudes and yields that a nuclear test anywhere in the world would have to exceed in order to be de tected. 6 As shown in figure 3 , explosions well below a kiloton can be detected with 90% confidence.
The probability that a state seeking to violate the CTBT can repeatedly evade detection drops rap idly with an increased number of tests. Additionally, geophysicists Ola Dahlman, Svein Mykkeltveit, and Hein Haak point out 7 that the violator would have to reduce its test explosion's yield by a factor of three to reduce the seismic detection probability from 90% to 10%. Further compounding the risk of being detected, violators must take into account the syn ergy provided by other IMS networks, possible onsite inspections, possible excess yields, and informa tion available from the thousands of seismic stations operated by academic and disaster-preparedness organizations to monitor earthquakes.
One evasion scenario, envisioned in the 1950s, is "cavity decoupling"-the use of a cave or under ground cavity intended to muffle the seismic waves from a nuclear explosion and thus reduce the radi ated signal. Even in that case, according to the 2012 NRC report, "an evasive tester in Asia, Europe, North Africa, or North America would need to re strict device yield to levels below 1 kiloton (even if the explosion were fully decoupled) to ensure no more than a 10 percent probability of detection for IMS and open monitoring networks" (page 10). 6 And that doesn't account for the deterrent provided by states' national technical means and from the IMS network of radionuclide sensors.
Iran's centrifuges
To build a nuclear weapon, one must first produce the fissile material that powers it. Historically, the most common path to that end was to extract plu tonium from the spent fuel rods of heavy-water re actors that used natural uranium. That method was India's path to its 1974 test explosion. A less common www.physicstoday.org
April 2014 Physics Today 43 3.6 Nuclear weapons approach was to enrich uranium to increase the abundance of its fissile isotope 235 U. Uranium en richment was difficult with bulky gaseous diffusion technology, and active diplomacy convinced several nations in the 1970s to abandon plans for reprocess ing spent fuel.
Thirty years later, centrifuge technology has advanced sufficiently that it is now the chosen path for acquiring highly enriched, bomb-grade ura nium. Because gas centrifuges require much less
The enrichment of uranium is measured in separative work units (SWUs) and is a nonlinear process. A common light water reactor (LWR) pro ducing about a gigawatt of electric power consumes each year approximately 25 tons of 3.75%-enriched fuel, obtained from 210 tons of natural uranium, and requires 120 000 SWU. Figure 4 offers an example of the extent to which the separative work diminishes as uranium is enriched from its natural form of 0.7% U, to its highly (90%) enriched form. It requires about 800 SWU per ton of uranium to make 130 kg of 4%-enriched reactor fuel. An additional 300 SWU yields 26 kg of 20% highly enriched uranium, and a further 200 SWU yields 5.6 kg of 90% HEU. Put an other way, it takes about 60% of the total work to produce low-enriched LWR fuel, 25% of the total to enrich the fuel to 20%, and another 15% of the total to raise that amount to 90%. Thus, a stockpile of 20% enriched material can significantly reduce the time a country requires to make a nuclear weapon.
Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, and the US currently en rich uranium. Commercially enriched stock is primarily supplied by Europe's URENCO (10 mil lion SWU/year), Russia's Rosatom (26 million), and France's AREVA (10 million). Iran's centrifuges pro duce 0.8-4 SWU/year, 8 and the country has claimed the right to pursue uranium enrichment in line with the NPT. But its claim has been a subject of dispute, considering that Iran had not reported its past en richment activities to the IAEA. The developments have prompted condemnation in UN Security Coun cil resolutions. Other nonweapon states that enrich uranium have negotiated acceptable reporting and inspection agreements with the IAEA. Figure 5 shows the growing numbers of cen trifuges Iran has installed and is operating at its large facility in Natanz since 2007. (To date, Natanz and the other main centrifuge facility, at Fordow, to gether house 19 000 centrifuges.)
P5 plus 1
An agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action be tween Iran and the P5 (plus Germany) took effect on 20 January 2014. In the agreement, which will last six months, Iran allows constraints to be placed on its nuclear program in exchange for a reduction of $7 billion in economic sanctions. The agreement ap proximately doubles the "breakout time" needed to obtain sufficient HEU to build a nuclear weapon; the IAEA counts 25 kg of 90% HEU as a "significant quantity," sufficient for a weapon.
According to the plan, 9 Iran agrees to halt ura nium enrichment above 5% and cap the production of 3.5%-enriched uranium; dilute or oxidize the country's near-20%-enriched stock; stop the instal lation of additional centrifuges at Natanz, Fordow, and elsewhere; freeze advances at the country's heavy-water reactor in Arak; allow monthly verifi cation inspections of the reactor and daily inspec tions of the Natanz and Fordow facilities; provide access to centrifuges, production facilities, uranium mines, and mills; and notify the IAEA in a timely manner about any new nuclear facilities.
The primary goal of the constraints is to main tain at least a six-month breakout time so that the UN can respond well before Iran can make suffi cient weapons-grade uranium if the country re neges on the agreement. Detection of the production of uranium enriched over 5% would be a violation of the joint agreement. David Albright, president of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security, and colleagues calculate a breakout time of www.physicstoday.org An inspection regime can weigh and examine cylinders containing feed, product, and wastes to 600 determine enrichment levels. Radio-frequency iden tification tags can track the cylinders. Similarly, tags, seals, and surveillance can be used to keep track of nuclear activity. Uranium stocks, records, and re- ceipts can be audited. Environmental samples of soil and water can be obtained in and outside a plant. Unannounced inspections are useful to detect undeclared material and operations.
The IAEA and the US have had considerable ex perience in nuclear monitoring. The technology used to monitor the "blend-down" of 500 tons of Russian HEU to reactor fuel is instructive. The den sity of 235 U in the uranium hexafluoride gas can be determined by measuring the emission of 186-keV gamma rays from the uranium. And the transmis sion of 122-keV gamma rays from cobalt-57 through the UF 6 gas determines total uranium density. The ratio of the two values yields the enrichment level. Twenty years of monitoring by Oak Ridge and Los Alamos (LANL) National Laboratories have veri fied the dilution of Russian HEU in the equivalent of 20 000 HEU warheads.
Confidence in untested nuclear weapons
The enduring US stockpile consists of several types of warheads; they include tactical and strategic bombs and land-and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The US has not tested any of them since 1992. The directors of LANL, Lawrence Livermore (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories have concluded that nuclear-explosive testing is not needed to resolve technical issues concerning the US nuclear stockpile.
At the November 2013 short course, 2 Texas A&M University's Marvin Adams surveyed the US Stockpile Stewardship Program and agreed with a central conclusion from the NRC's 2012 report (ref erence 6, page 1):
Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stew ardship are in place, the committee judges that the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. . . . Sustaining those technical capabilities will require . . . :
• a strong science and engineering base. . . ;
• a vigorous surveillance program;
• adequate ratio of performance margins to uncertainties; • modernized production facilities; and • a competent and capable work force.
Stockpile stewardship assesses the status of warheads, including the impact of changes made to them, and takes any needed actions to maintain near certainty that weapons would meet require Scientists at LANL and LLNL have determined a lower limit of 85 to 100 years for the lifetime of a plutonium "pit," the part associated with the fission stage of a nuclear explosive. The JASONs, a group of technical experts who advise the Defense Depart ment, agreed with that assessment. One may simply reuse the plutonium-based pit when a weapon's life is extended. However, long-term stockpile steward ship requires the ability to manufacture new pits. Currently the Los Alamos Pit Production Facility fulfills that role and can produce 6-10 pits per year; further investment could boost its production to as many as 80 pits per year.
Modifications in the warheads are being consid ered to enhance their safety, security, and perfor mance margins as part of upcoming life-extension programs (LEPs); see PHYSICS TODAY, December 2013, page 26. According to Adams, the actions being considered in LEPs can include refurbishing existing warheads, reusing the nuclear components from different warheads, and replacing nuclear components with designs not previously in the stockpile. All LEPs require some manufacturing, and any change in a weapon requires the assess ment of experts familiar with the latest advances in experiments, theory, and computation. Opportuni ties to introduce changes are relatively rare because LEPs are carried out on a multidecade time scale.
The following points summarize developments in stockpile stewardship since the NAS's 2002 CTBT study was carried out:
• LEPs are a reality, successfully carried out for land-and submarine-based warheads.
• Peta-scale computation is now available to aid design, stewardship, and understanding of a weapon's behavior. Although the NAS and NRC panels concluded that the US can maintain a reliable stockpile without nuclear-explosive testing, the stewardship pro gram's future success isn't guaranteed. The biggest concern is the ability to attract, develop, and retain a first-class work force. Adams urges several steps: Professionals in the US should be involved with related nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and sci ence issues to maintain their expertise and skills. The weapons labs should continue to maintain first-rate facilities, some for unclassified work. Experts out side the weapons facilities can provide helpful as sessments, as it is difficult to assess quality "from the inside." The gaps in understanding of weapons' be havior can be addressed with ongoing experiment, theory, simulation, and analysis of past data.
Final thoughts
There's a highly compelling reason the US and other nuclear-weapon-possessing states don't test nuclear weapons: To do so would not only invite a new arms race, it would make addressing the nuclear pro grams in Iran and North Korea much harder and put the nonproliferation regime at risk.
India and Pakistan are examples of what hap pens in the absence of an arms-control agreement. Both countries have roughly the same nuclear capa bility and are continuing to build larger and more sophisticated arsenals. International efforts to deal with their competition have not led to a halt, let alone a reversal. A 2006 agreement between India and the US gives India more flexibility on nuclear imports. And the US war in Afghanistan loosened international pressure on Pakistan's nuclear pro grams. One can hope that at least for the near term, the development of confidence-and securitybuilding measures will give diplomacy time to pre vent a nuclear crisis.
